Back to the database
Record STMT-W589FADAdvisory

Tying the knot with a robot: legal and philosophical foundations for human–artificial intelligence matrimony

Position paper State lawGlobalunknown

This article explores the legal and philosophical foundations that could support human-artificial intelligence matrimony as robots develop more human-like traits and capabilities. It analyzes U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding marriage and constitutional rights to evaluate what criteria human-AI unions would need to meet. The paper concludes that while personhood criteria and legal capacities are relevant, social acceptance and overcoming bias against artificial entities will likely be primary drivers of legal development.

Summary and content fields are drawn from the document text and are pending editorial review.

Who issued it

SpringerIndustry
Publisher
Legal forceAdvisory
Under whose authorityState law
Judged fromfull text

Who it governs

Researchers and academicsGeneral public

Researchers and scholars exploring the intersection of artificial intelligence, legal rights, philosophy, and roboethics.

Sectors
Research and science · academic research

What the document contains

What's covered

The paper examines legal precedents concerning marriage, the philosophical criteria for personhood and rights, and how society might adapt to human-robot romantic relationships and potential marriages.

What's missing

The text does not provide binding regulatory rules, technical specifications for AI systems, or specific statutory drafts for legal reform.

Key takeaways
  • Technological progress may lead to meaningful relationships between humans and sophisticated robots, generating a demand for human-AI matrimony.
  • U.S. Supreme Court decisions expanding marriage definitions provide analytical criteria for whether human-AI unions could assert a right to marry.
  • Robots would ultimately need to possess personhood characteristics, such as the capacity to contract and engage in intimate relationships, or simulate them sufficiently.
  • Social acceptance of intelligent non-humans as life partners is more likely to influence legal development than strict personhood criteria alone.
  • Peter Singer’s arguments on speciesism imply that AIs with specific human-like qualities should not be unjustifiably denied certain rights.
Issued16 April 2020
Length1,534 words
FormatNot recorded
Scopeglobal

How it scores

Pending review

Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.

Accountability

0/5

Clear responsibility for AI outcomes

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Fairness

1/5

Non-discrimination and equitable treatment

However, AIs are likely to face bias due to their “artificial” rather than biological nature.

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Human Dignity

1/5

Respect for the inherent worth of persons

Yet, Peter Singer’s influential argument regarding speciesism in the context of animal rights implies that AIs with specific human-like qualities cannot be justifiably denied certain rights.

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Human Oversight

0/5

Humans remain in control of consequential decisions

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Privacy

0/5

Protection of personal data and private life

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Transparency

0/5

Openness about how AI systems work and are used

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Enforcement

0/5

Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Impact Assessment

0/5

Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use

Abstract

screening score · 2026-10-24

Topics

artificial_intelligence personhood marriage constitutional_law roboethics