Record STMT-WD1331DAspirational

Persons or Property? Legal Status of Humanoid Robots in Three Contemporary Novels

Position paper International lawGlobalin force

This academic article investigates the legal status of humanoid robots and artificial entities in three contemporary novels: Ian McEwan's Machines Like Me, Jeanette Winterson's Frankissstein, and Kazuo Ishiguro's Klara and the Sun. The author examines whether fictional artificial entities are treated as legal objects or legal subjects, and applies the legal concept of homo juridicus to explore what changes in law would be required for robots to attain legal personhood. Finally, the paper reflects on how exploring these themes in literature can provide insights into human attitudes toward the potential rights and legal treatment of future real-life AI.

Summary and content fields are drawn from the document text and are pending editorial review.

Who issued it

Uppsala UniversityAcademic · SE

Publisher

Legal forceAspirational

Under whose authorityInternational law

Judged fromfull text

Who it governs

Researchers and academicsGeneral public

Researchers and legal scholars interested in the intersection of artificial intelligence, ethics, literature, and legal personhood.

Sectors

Research and science · legal scholarship and literature

What the document contains

What's covered

The paper analyzes how three contemporary novels depict the legal status, liability, and societal integration of humanoid robots and artificial intelligence, comparing them against real-world legal frameworks for personhood and property.

What's missing

The document does not provide actual binding regulations, enforcement mechanisms, or concrete legislative proposals for real-world AI governance.

Key takeaways

Humanoid robots in the analyzed contemporary novels are consistently treated as legal objects and property rather than legal subjects.
Granting AI full legal status requires expanding traditional legal definitions of a 'person' or 'human' beyond biological limits.
The legal concept of homo juridicus demonstrates that robots may possess certain intellectual or practical capacities of legal actors while completely lacking legal personhood.
Reflecting on how fictional characters and literary robots are treated helps illuminate human attitudes and ethical intuitions regarding real-life AI governance.

Outline

· 1 Introduction
· 2 Adam in Machines Like Me – Ambulant Laptop or Poet in Love?
· 3 Klara in Klara and the Sun – Family Member or Vacuum Cleaner?
· 4 XX-BOTs and Scanned Brains in Frankissstein – Narrow-Goal Slaves or Sources of Eternal Life?
· 5 Robot Juridicus – Robots like Adam, Klara and XX-BOTS as Legal Persons and Legal Actors?
· 6 Should Adam, Klara and XX-BOTS as Fictional Characters Have Rights?
· 7 Conclusion

Issued2021

Length8,705 words · 22 pages

FormatNot recorded

Scopeglobal

How it scores

Pending review

Each score is backed by a quote verified against the document text. Editorial review has not yet confirmed them.

Accountability

2/5

Clear responsibility for AI outcomes

Regarding liability issues, there is no personal responsibility for Adam.

2 Adam in Machines Like Me

screening score · 2026-10-23

Fairness

0/5

Non-discrimination and equitable treatment

Introduction

screening score · 2026-10-23

Human Oversight

0/5

Humans remain in control of consequential decisions

Introduction

screening score · 2026-10-23

Privacy

0/5

Protection of personal data and private life

Introduction

screening score · 2026-10-23

Transparency

0/5

Openness about how AI systems work and are used

Introduction

screening score · 2026-10-23

Enforcement

0/5

Consequences and compliance mechanisms with real force

Introduction

screening score · 2026-10-23

Impact Assessment

0/5

Required assessment of an AI system's risks/impacts before or during use

Introduction

screening score · 2026-10-23

Topics

robot_rights legal_personhood ai_ethics law_and_literature humanoid_robots